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This report aims to give a sell recommendation for GoPro, Inc. GoPro, as the 
oldest and first player in the action camera market, has always been recognized 
for its name and brand status. The Karma Drone failure in 2017 disappointed 
GoPro’s clients and the company is still recovering from that. GoPro is now 
under huge pressure among other action cameras in a market that is increasing 
exponentially, especially with the rise of Japanese companies. For GoPro to 
differentiate itself in the market, new products and features have to come up to 
impress buyers. For the future, it is expected that GoPro strongly diminishes its 
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▪ With a $4.31 share price, comparing with the current 
market price of $4.47, investment is expected to yield a negative 
return of 3,67%, resulting in a SELL investment recommendation. 
▪ With the action camera market growing at a CAGR of 
11,24% for the next 10 years, GoPro is operating in a fierce 
competition and heavily exposed to threats brought by 
technological advancements. 
▪ The entrance in the drones’ market in 2016 was not as 
successful as expected turning into a failed investment. After 
having invested $217M in R&D and Marketing, the company 
decided to discontinue the production of its Karma drone due to 
low margins of -31,5%, resulting in a total net loss of $419M in 
2016. 
▪ Revenues are not high enough to support operating 
expenses. If GoPro is not successful in penetrating Drone market 
again or in adding new features to its cameras that impress 
costumers, the company might not be able to grow their revenue 
like past years, neither recognize benefits from the investment 
made. There is huge uncertainty from GoPro around new products 
and new markets. 
▪ Millennials generation hungry for travelling and the rise of 
social media provide an opportunity for action cameras. We 
consider brand awareness as an opportunity to expand 
geographically to Asia Pacific. 
Company description 
GoPro Inc. is an American company founded in 2002 that rapidly 
became popular turning into one of the world’s most famous brand 
of action cameras. GoPro’s Class A common stock is traded on the 
Nasdaq stock exchange. 
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(Values in $ millions) 2018 2019 2020F 
Revenues 1148 839 907 
EBITDA -58 -107 -80 
Net Loss -109 -149 -126 
Gross Margin 31% 35% 41% 
    
Debt/Equity 66% 111% 3731% 
ROIC -41,7% -63,3% -49% 
EPS -$0,78 -$1,04  
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GoPro is an American action camera company founded in 2002 by Nick 
Woodman, an extreme sports enthusiast. Until that year, cameras were mainly 
not waterproof and could not capture action in good quality. Therefore, Woodman 
came up with the idea of developing a durable camera that could help athletes to 
enjoy the moment while recording themselves practicing sports. GoPro’s 
revenues are composed by a wide range of products. All the earnings not 
related with cameras are reflected in the price as an average (see evolution in 
graph 1).  
In what concerns the number of camera units shipped, there was an initial boom 
in sales when the company first went public in 2014, and expectations were huge 
for this new retailer (see graph 2).  
HERO7 Black was the number one selling camera in 2018 in volume in the digital 
sector and the first GoPro camera based on the new research-driven design 
approach. This was a success for the company, gaining lots of positive reviews 
and GoPro's first quarterly profit in over a year. To be more specific, GoPro's 
HERO7 line plus Fusion was the top-four selling cameras in their category1, which 
helped the company boost its margins, as it was priced at nearly $600.  
Regarding the mounts and accessories - either attached to the camera or sold 
separately – these include handlebar, helmet, roll bar, floaty, charging 
accessories or cables, camera cases and dive filters.  
GoPro Plus subscription service, acquired for $4.99 per month, provides 
subscribers free replacements for all broken cameras, discounts on camera 
accessories, and unlimited cloud storage. In 2019 GoPro expanded the Plus 
business by providing more value and differentiated offerings, which highlights 
increasing efforts on marketing to drive awareness for new subscribers and to 
engage GoPro’s global consumer base (see table 1). 
GoPro’s software apps – GoPro Quick editing app – are free and enable users 
to quickly edit videos on-the-go, simplifying content transfer from cameras to 
mobile phones. Regarding social media, GoPro's YouTube 
 
___________________________ 




Subsciption revenue 123.291$           185.381$         269.471$          
% of Revenue 10% 16% 32%
Growth rate in % 50% 45%
Number of subscribers 130.000 85.000 305.000





















channel achieved a record of 178M views in the third quarter of 2019, an increase 
of 83% YOY. In this same quarter of 2019, the number of followers grew by 1.2 
million to more than 42 million across all social media.  
The products are available in over 30.000 retail outlets and spread by 100 
countries through a combination of direct sales channel and indirect 
distribution channel2. GoPro’s cameras are extremely convenient in the sense 
that individuals can attach the cameras to themselves, hands-free, enabling 
physical demanding activities to happen at the same time, particularly extreme 
sports. The small size and weight of the cameras make them easy to carry.  
It is important to mention that GoPro’s business is affected by seasonality, 
having recorded the highest levels of revenue always in the fourth quarter of the 
year, coinciding with the holiday shopping season (see graph 3).  
Regarding GoPro’s stock performance3, whereas in 2014 GoPro’s cumulative 
monthly returns of Class A common stock outperformed the market, as of August 
2016, GoPro’ shares had fallen 59.6% since the IPO, decreasing GoPro’s 
valuation in 90%, while the S&P 500 index returned 11.4%. GoPro’s stock 
performance has been shaped by declining valuations, followed by the drone 
failure. From this point on, the stock price has substantially declined mainly 
because of the concerns regarding the disappointing demand of consumers 
expressing mixed feedback about the latest Hero versions. Costumers seem to 
prefer GoPro Silver’s LCD screen which has better video quality.  
Through the past 7 years, GoPro’s strongest competitors appeared in the market. 
In 2012 Sony launched its first action camera, Garmin in 2013 and Nikon in 2016. 
This led to a reduction of GoPro’s share in the market, a decline in revenue, in 
gross margin expectations and consequently in the target price. GoPro’s up-to-
date stock price return is -3,67%, still underperforming the S&P 500 Index.  
At this point we believe that the stock provides a poor opportunity to climb in for 






2 GoPro, Inc. 2018. “2018 Annual Report”. 



















GoPro designs and develops its products in the United States, France, Mexico 
and Romania and its headquarters are present in San Francisco Bay Area. It 
outsources most of its manufacturing to contract firms in Mexico.  
Regarding the sales segment channels, GoPro sells its cameras globally through 
direct retailers and indirect wholesale distributors (see evolution in graph 4). 
The cameras are available in 45.000 stores4 mainly in North America and Europe. 
Its direct retail sales accounted for 48% of revenues in 2018 and include: 
Independent retailers: location-based manufacturers sell the products to 
specialty retailers especially in the United States. These retailers are provided 
with a deep personalized service, including special personnel education about 
GoPro’s products. These costs are included in General and Administrative costs, 
which in average represent 8,22% of revenues.  
Big box retail channels: Amazon.com, Inc., Best Buy - one of the largest U.S. 
electronics retailers -, Inc., and Wal-Mart, Inc. - world’s largest mass retailer - are 
examples of large retailer to whom GoPro sells. 
Mid-market retailers: with a large regional influence, these retailers are focused 
on specific matters, and so the products are available in consumer electronics 
stores like Apple store and in sports stores such as Quicksilver, Billabong or 
ProDirect. Middle-market companies reported an increased revenue of 77% in the 
year ending 2019, which indicates a growth opportunity for GoPro. 
E-commerce channel: worldwide sell of products through online store 
gopro.com (both online and offline advertising).   
 
Regarding indirect wholesale distribution channel, GoPro sells its products to 
more than 55 distributors - accounted for 52% of revenues in 2018 - who resell 


















Karma Drone Effect 
 
GoPro entered the Drone Market in September 2016. At the launch of the Karma 
Drone, there was a huge excitement, even though the company had no 
competitive advantage in that market. Despite the CEO’s optimistic 
announcements about Karma drone before the holiday shopping season in 
November 2017 - “a fantastic platform capable to further its capabilities with next-
generation drone offerings" -, the production did not go as planned.  
The first reason for the failure occurred due to the late entrance of GoPro in the 
market drone, which was already dominated by specialized companies as DJI 
Innovations5, whose first line of Phantom drone appeared in 2013. The second 
reason for this early exit, was due to GoPro’s underestimation about the difficulty 
of producing a drone. And so, late in 2016, to combat the slow revenue growth 
driven by the low demand for action cameras, it rushed launching the Karma 
drone to the market without properly testing it. With low experts in the area and 
few technology preparations, the product was created with power failure issues 
and sold at a higher price than its best competitors. The company overestimated 
its own brand strength by attributing the Karma Drone (without the camera in 
itself) a price of $799, being more expensive than its direct competitor the DJI 
Mavic Pro. 
To finish with, costumers started realizing the danger of drones in a matter of 
privacy concerns, leading to restrictions for the use of these devices. Having no 
other solution, the device had to be pulled off the market in 2017. As a 
consequence, in terms of regulatory actions, Europe and the United States will 
probably reduce the total addressable market in the next years.  
The Karma Drone situation was responsible for a 37% drop in the fourth quarter 
revenue of 2017. The 2018 revenue was affected as well, dropping to $1.15 
billion compared to $1.18 billion in 2017. Consequently, since the business was 
not going as well as expected, GoPro decided to cut more than 254 jobs, a fifth of 
its total workforce. The company decided to exit the drone market, and there is no 
expectation to reenter it. Besides, the Karma Drone situation ultimately resulted in 
a decrease of the average selling price in 2018. It would have increased 1% YOY 
if not for the Karma Drone. GoPro’s exit from the aerial business in 2018 
prejudicated the company a lot (see table 2) since it was the company's best 
opportunity to differentiate itself in such a saturated market. With this, GoPro 
immediately fell behind competitors. 
5 “DJI action camera poses threat to GoPro”. 2019. BBC News.  
Operating margin 2016 -31,5%
R&D Expense Increase 2016 48,5%
Sales & Marketing Expense Increase 2016 37,1%
Net loss increase 2016 1260%


















GoPro completed the initial public offering in July 2014 at $24 per share.  It 
possesses two types of shares. According to the company’s annual report, 
GoPro’s “(..) Class A common stock is listed on the Nasdaq Global Select Market 
under the symbol “GPRO”. Class B common stock is not listed on any stock 
exchange” (see table 3 for the number of shares). The shareholders have been 
diluted in 2018 with total shares outstanding growing by 3,4% to 2019. GoPro’s 
ownership structure is divided in Institutional investors, Insiders, General 
Public and Hedge Funds (see graph 5). 
In GoPro the biggest stake of shares outstanding, 48%, is held by Institutions, 
while Hedge funds own 9% of the company’s total shares. In this case investors 
don’t need to be worried about the volatility of stock prices because hedge funds 
don’t owe a significant stake. We believe institutional shareholders still influence 
the value of the company due to their high stake capable of exercising significant 
voting power and of promoting high value-driven decisions. The largest 
institutional holders of GoPro are the Vanguard Group with 8,48% ownership and 
Blackrock Fund Advisors, accounting for 6,64% of the company. 
General public account for 23% of outstanding shares.  With such a stake, retail 
investors can, collectively, play an important role in the company policies, as well 
as exercise the power of decline a merge or acquisition. 
The higher the Insider ownership, the greater the likelihood for insiders to be an 
incentive to handle the company for the long term. GoPro insiders own about 
20% of total shares, which is large enough to impact shareholder’s return. This 
kind of ownership does increase the chance that the company runs in the interest 
of all shareholders.  
Currently, GoPro’s board of directors6 has Mr. Woodman serving as Chief 
Executive Officer - given his knowledge of the company, and industry. GoPro’s 
board of directors are not considered much experienced since they have only 2,7 
years average of work in the company. The compensation of the board seems 
quite adequate since the composition of the board leadership and the division of 
responsibilities is maintained effectively and supports the approach for 
addressing the risks. 
 
___________________________ 
6 Board of directors consists of 14 directors and executive officers. GoPro’s Class A or Class B common stock  
is owned by more than 5% of stockholders. 
shares in thousands Class A Class B
Shares outstanding 120.428 33.097


















GoPro operates all over the world, and its revenue is organized based on its ship-
to destinations: Americas, EMEA and APAC (see graph 6). 
Americas is the geographic region holding the biggest slice of the revenues, 
being now responsible for 46%. However, in the past three years its share has 
been reduced by 5%, which can be explained by the entrance of other players in 
the market like Garmin, Polaroid etc. We predict this share to decline in the years 
to come, albeit slowly. 
Korea and Thailand were recognized by their two years of consecutive sell-
through growth, since unit sales rose by 27% and 88% respectively, year-over-
year in 20182, according to German market research (GfK). As it can be seen, 
APAC represents a constant growth of its slice in GoPro’s total revenues, 
accounting for 24% in 2019, which goes in line with the overall market.  
We believe that a more aggressive reinforcement of GoPro in this market, by its 
expansion, can accelerate its revenues growth. With the rise of marketing efforts 
and POP displays provided to retailers in APAC region, we forecast GoPro’s 
share to grow faster in APAC than in the other regions in further years . 
EMEA represents the second largest percentage, namely 30% of the company’s 
revenue and has been representing a stable share for the past years. Lately in 
2019, GoPro had three of the top five cameras in the action camera category in 
Europe, according to GfK. For the future we assumed this share will decrease 
(see graph 7 for future evolution).  
Macroeconomic Environment 
This sector is likely to benefit from the economic performance, backed by 
improving macroeconomic environment and rise in costumers’ disposable income 
(graph 8). The level of consumer spending in an action camera company 
depends on fluctuations in inflation, volatility of GDP, tourism indicators, etc.   
Looking at the economic situation in each region of importance to GoPro: Despite 
the Brexit issues, European economy is continuing to gradually recover thanks to 
steady personal consumption. Driven by improved employment, the U.S. 
economy is also improving due to solid personal consumption. On the contrary, 
the Chinese economy is seeing a slowdown trend due to trade friction between 
the U.S. and China. The economic situation in Japan is gradually recovering 




















Since GoPro’s cash flows are all in USD, we used the 2%-dollar inflation rate 
YOY to predict GoPro’s revenues for all the regions, according to IMF forecasts, 
and turn them into nominal values (graph 9). 
Another indicator with relevance for GoPro is the GDP. The action camera market 
is increasing in the same direction as the GDP growth, due to the positive 
correlation between GDP and consumer spending on goods and services. It is of 
extreme importance to mention that the GDP7 in Asia Pacific is expected to 
increase at 7% from 2021 until 2024, which highlights prospects of growth and 
signs of opportunity for GoPro and its peers to invest in this region. Considering 
the EMEA region, in Africa the GDP is increasing since 2017. In what concerns 
Europe, IMF forecasts a quite volatile GDP growth stabilizing at 4,3% from 2024 
on (graph 10). 
The GDP in Middle East rose 10,2% in 2018 and increased at a lower rate after 
that. Americas register a quite volatile GDP growth rate until 2021, which then 
stabilizes at 4% until 2024. IMF forecasts American GDP to increase at 2,9% 
YOY until 2030.  
Since GoPro’s action camera is a product that most of consumers resort to when 
travelling, we checked that the international tourism industry (ITA) has 
experienced steady growth almost every year (graph 11). It is forecasted that the 
number of international visitor arrivals in Asia Pacific will amount to approximately 
767 billion in 2020 with a YOY change of 5.4%, according to Statista (graph 12). 
Within the region, it is predicted that Vietnam will dominate the Asia Pacific 
destinations in terms of average annual growth.  
Extreme Sports9 has witnessed a boom in the last 5 years, becoming more 
popular than ever the willingness for adventure and creativity to push limits and 
self-challenge. Due to its increased popularity, extreme and adventurous sports 
are likely to display popularity trends for the foreseeable future. Its predicted that 










7 International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook  
9 Sports Niche Markets. 2019. Onecaribbean.org 
9 “The rise and rise of extreme sports”. April 2019. Teton Gravity Research. 
“Today, snowboarding is 
accepted as skiing in most 
ski resorts worldwide and so 
the number 
of snowboarders increased 
by 77% 
making snowboarding the 
fastest growing winter sport 
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Action Camera Market 
 
In terms of brand recognition, GoPro is one of the leading players operating in the 
action camera market. Driven by the booming consumer electronics industry and 
the strong trend of sharing content on social networks (see graph 13), the global 
action camera market is expected to witness substantial growth during our 
forecasted period. 
In a broader perspective, revenue in the Consumer Electronics10 segment is 
expected to show a CAGR of 2,1% from 2019 until 2023 (see graph 14). Most of 
the revenue is generated in China, registering a market volume of US$245M in 
2019. This indicates that 1,1% of the world GDP will be spent on consumer 
electronics in 2023. Besides, the user penetration rate is 23.8% in 2019 and is 
expected to amount 34,9% by 2023.  
Today, contrary to previous generations, there is a greater use of small, compact, 
lightweight, designed for rugged conditions devices thanks to the disruption of the 
consumer electronics industry. As followed, the camera segment has witnessed a 
great advancement in terms of product quality, efficiency, and practice 
application. For example, the adoption of 360° cameras with the integration of 
image stabilization (VR-vibration reduction), offers the user a real-life experience 
of any event and is becoming a famous trend in the emerging markets.  
Increasing popularity of mobile apps and social networking websites such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram (graph 15) will leverage the action camera 
industry growth over the next years, even for professional usage, which is visible 
through the 80% of US teens that use YouTube to share content and to watch 
videos of their sports activities captured by action cameras in this case (graph 15 
and 16). 
Based on all this, the market value of the global action camera market11 
accounted for $4.237M in 2017 and is expected to reach $16.767M by 2030, 
registering a CAGR of 11,16% (graph 17). Despite being a market demonstrating 
prospects of growth, in relation to the rest of the economy, the action camera 
market is positioned with a 0,01% share of the world GDP.  
 
___________________________ 
10 Statista, November 2019, based on IMF, World Bank, UN and Eurostat 
11 “Total action camera market revenue amounted to nearly 4.5 billion U.S. dollars in 2018 and Statista predicts the market to 
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In what concerns the action camera market share by region, 39% of the market 
has already been captured by America. In 2020 this share will start to decrease 
until 2030 when it will represent 34,82%. 36% of the market belongs to APAC and 
this region is the only one that is expected to increase its percentage – to 47% in 
2030. This growth can be explained by the growing internet connectivity in Asia - 
reaching this year 48% of global digital connectivity -, high density of population 
and travelers and a big rise in active social users. EMEA accounts for 25% of the 
action camera market and is expected to decline slowly until 2030, reaching a 
percentage of 18% (graph 18). 
Peers 
The action camera industry is increasing, rising the probability of new competitors 
to enter the market, which may affect GoPro’s market share in the future. 
Currently, the largest threat to the action camera’s American brand is the rise of 
Asian companies that manufacture products with similar design and almost the 
same (good) quality as GoPro. Most of these peers are not listed in the market. 
GoPro, despite being the oldest player and most recognized brand in the action 
camera market, doesn't have a compelling, reasonably priced product yet in 
comparison to its peers. Instead, the company stands as one of the most 
expensive action camera manufacturers (table 4), and still registers a negative 
return on investment (table 5). The features present in GoPros’ cameras are 
similar enough to its competitors, being indifferent for the consumers which brand 
to choose at the moment of purchase. Being more expensive to buy a GoPro, 
people tend to prefer one of its competitors.  
 
 
In this sense, the key players are gaining competitive advantage in this market 
because they are coming up with new ideas followed by the continuous and 
consistent innovation of technology features at reasonable prices. The number of 
large vendors that operate internationally and seek market expansion through 
investments, research and development or cost efficiency, is rising rapidly.  
To start with, SZ DJI Technology ltd is a Chinese privately held, manufacturing 
company found in 2010, that designs, manufactures and sells aerial photography 
and flying devices, particularly drones. Its production is set up in Shenzhen, a 
very strong and cheap consumer electronics industry place thanks to the hire of 
active scientists and engineers, turning DJI into a cost leadership company. 









in thousands GoPro Garmin Nikon Sony
ROIC -17,43% 14,12% 4,50% 3,09%
Investment 427.999$       1.251.951$   1.865.946$  13.942.885$     
Source: Annual Reports and Bloomberg
Source: Statista and Market 
Research 2019 
 
Latest action camera model price
Gopro 499,00$                        
Nikon 499,95$                        
Xiaomi 423,32$                        
Sony 399,99$                        
Garmin 399,99$                        
Ricoh 392,00$                        
Olympus 335,99$                        












camera, the Osmo Action Camera12 (adequate for vloggers and selfie 
generation), competing directly and having a lot in common with the GoPro 
HERO7 Black model, since they look alike. DJI differentiates itself by its brand 
value in the industry, resulting in a fierce competitor for GoPro.  
Garmin Ltd., with a sales volume of around $2,6billion13 in 2019, is a 1989 
American multinational, specialty technology company, that follows a 
differentiation strategy by being a multi-faceted company selling GPS features in 
5 different markets:  Automotive, Fitness, Wellness, and Outdoor. Garmin’s main 
product is the GPs, but it also sells a 4K action cameras through the outdoor 
segment with a similar outlook as GoPro. Garmin achieved a net income in 2019 
of $591M and a gross margin 60%. Its focus on innovation let Garmin conquer a 
5% share on Fitness wearable’s market beating companies like Polar, Apple and 
Fitbit. Also focusing on having superior engineering departments and better 
design qualities, Garmin is being the first to market with new GPS technology, 
resulting in consumer loyalty since buyers perceive the engineers as experts and 
trend setters. Part of its great success was achieved thanks to the large and 
permanent investment in Research & Development. 
Meanwhile, Sony’s Corporation14 founded in 1946 in Japan, is one of the 
leaders in the camera industry recognized for its high-quality products. The 
company has more than 10.000 employees. In the action camera segment, it 
offers product quality at flexible prices. Since 2017, Sony’s profit grew 
exponentially, reaching a 74% gross profit margin, net income of $3.361M and is 
worth $78.996M all in 2019. Since Sony has a much-diversified product portfolio, 
it is considered a generic competitor.   
Nikon Corporation, despite having joined the action camera market later than 
the others, offers three different cameras in its action camera range. The 
KeyMission 170 is the closest competitor to GoPros’ cameras. However, it lags a 
little behind among the brands of action cameras. Nikon’s financial outlook is 
positive, with $6.505M revenues15, while its gross profit margin has been 
increasing these last few years, achieving 43% and accounting for a net income 
of $611M11 in 2019. In fact, the company has been experiencing a slight increase 
since 2015.  
___________________________ 
12 David Coleman Photography. 2019. Have Camerawilltravel.com. “GoPro Competitors | 4K Action Cameras that Aren’t Go 
Pros” 
13 Garmin financial filings. 2019. “Garmin's Growth Is Still a Long Way from the Finish Line”. 
13 Garmin, LTD. 2018. “Garmin 2018 Annual Report”. 
14 Sony Corporation. 2019. “Sony 2019 Annual Report”. 
15 Nikon Corporation. 2018. “Nikon Report 2018” 























Looking at some key performance indicators of the peers, GoPro is running 
poorly in most of the captions presented above, registering negative net income 
and return on investment. In terms of market size, GoPro is the smallest, 
presenting lower gross margins. In relation to others, GoPro has stopped grown 
in the last years. Despite from 2014 until 2017 GoPro grew more than its 
competitors, from 2017 until now, a turndown movement has been dominating 
(graph 19).  
Millennial Generation Trends  
“Help people to capture and share their most meaningful experiences” 
The U.S. Census Bureau characterizes Millennials as people born between 1980 
and 2000. The Millennial generation makes up around half of the U.S. workforce, 
according to a Global Millennial survey made by Deloitte in 201916. Based on 
13.416 millennials questioned across 42 countries, 57% of them aspire to travel 
and see the world, whereas 49% want to buy a home or start families or have 
children. Interestingly, 62% of millennials are women more interested in exploring 
the world than are men. Unlike previous generations, 78% of Millennials are less 
likely to spend their money on physical products, but instead they are investing 
more into desirable experiences such as music festivals, traveling and sporting 
events.  
Driven by the strong incentive for a healthier lifestyle17 in today’s generation (table 
7), the world is witnessing a trend towards adventure tourism (graph 20). 
Activities such as skydiving, bungee jumping, rock and mountain climbing, 
surfing, scuba diving, snorkeling, skiing and wakeboarding, are becoming a 
demand driver for action cameras that enable people to record recreational 




16 Deloitte Global Millennial Survey. 2019. “Societal Discord and technological transformation create a “generation disrupted”. 
17 Outdoor Industry Association. 2019. “2020 Forecasting Report” 
 
Growth of consumer spending on food&nutrition since 2010 108%
Market Value of health sector in $billion 3.400
Outdoor consumers that use apps for health and fitness 17%
Woman's age folowing a fitness "guro" on social media 13-32y
Health Trends
in thousands GoPro Garmin Nikon Sony
Return on investment -17,43% 14,12% 4,50% 3,09%
Gross profit margin 32% 60% 43% 74%
Asset turnover 1,20 0,48 0,63 0,40
Revenues 839$              2.655.273$     6.505.532$        78.996.012$  
R&D Expense 153.847$      443.361$        587.183$            N/A
Net Income -110.462 $    591.695$        611.364$            854.800$        
Operating Expenses 427.999$      1.251.951$     1.865.946$        13.942.885$  
Source: Annual Reports and Bloomberg
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They are as well the first generation of digital natives, with a great affinity for 
technology and used to access instantaneously to price comparisons, peer 
reviews and information. 90% of Millennials have a smartphone—most of whom 
(93%) use it to access the Internet. Half of the Millennial generation are regular 
users of smart TVs, computers and mobile device, online websites and social 
apps. According to the financial times, it is forecasted that by 2020, millennials 
will make up 35% of the global workforce and are expected to account for 30% of 
retail sales in the United States - $1.4 trillion in spending. Bearing this in mind, 
creating, sharing, and capturing memories during experiences, as action cameras 
enable, goes along with the enumerated trends.  
Drivers & Forecasting  
Revenue Value Drivers  
GoPro’s revenue is defined by average selling price multiplied by camera units 
shipped and the company does not disclose revenue by product category. What 
generates most of GoPro’s revenues are the cameras. In order to forecast 
revenues, we used the estimated action camera growth by region as a value 
driver: Americas, Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) and Asia Pacific 
(APAC). Knowing the correspondent compound annual growth rates (CAGRs) for 
each region, we were able to determine the evolution of the action camera market 
from 2017 until 2030.  
In the past, GoPro has experienced the highest levels of revenue in the fourth 
quarter of the year, coinciding with the holiday shopping season, mainly in the 
United States and Europe. Usually, around 35% of GoPro’s total revenue come in 
the holiday season quarter. Beginning 2019, the early sales of the new HERO8 
action camera appeared to be strong, however the fourth quarter differed from the 
years before, not yielding the usual revenue growth. Each year the holiday 
shopping season can last anywhere between 25 and 31 days from Thanksgiving 
until the Christmas. Since in 2019 Thanksgiving was on November 28 (fourth 
Thursday of November), the holiday season was six days shorter that year, 
marking the shortest possible holiday shopping season since 2013 in the United 
States.  
GoPro is conscious that the company “does not expect to continue to grow in the 
future at the same rate as it has in the past.”, according to GoPro. Before getting 
public, GoPro already had a lot of success. From 2017 on, the company started 
decreasing its revenues. Revenues declined by 27% from 2018 to 2019, mainly 













2020 on, the company is expected to increase its revenues but at a slower rate 
than the action camera market, registering a CAGR of 5,30% from 2020 until 
2030, compared to 11,24% in the action camera market (graph 22). 
AMERICAS 
Looking at each region in detail, according to GoPro’s annual report, the 
Americas represented “46% of GoPro’s revenue in 2018, 43% in 2017 and 50% 
in 2016”. USA represents the greatest share of GoPro’s American revenues, 
comprising 39%, 45% and 47% of the total revenue in 2018, 2017 and 2016, 
respectively. Most leading industry players are located in the US – Drift, Garmin 
and iON. In comparison to other regions, people in North America tend to be 
more sportive and enthusiastic about the adoption of the latest technology 
products, which are often introduced there first. In line with this, Americas held 
the largest market share in 2017, registering a market value of $1.691M and this 
region is projected to grow at a CAGR of 10% during the forecasted period. In this 
way, the action camera market in Americas will increase from $2.046M in 2019 to 
$5.837M in 2030.  
ASIA PACIFIC (APAC) 
Meanwhile, the Asia-Pacific region - accounting for the second largest region as 
percentage of action camera revenues with 34.07% in 2017 - is expected to reach 
the highest CAGR of 14%.  This is mainly due to the fact that Asia Pacific is 
witnessing a growth in the action camera due to the rise in disposable income in 
countries like Philippines, China, Hong Kong, India and Japan, which are gaining 
awareness about advance technologies and smart devices. APAC is a region, 
where action cameras are mostly perceived as a novelty. Besides, the tourism 
industry in Asia Pacific is expected to grow significantly. Consequently, these 
countries are heavily contributing to the overall market share and the higher 
CAGR. For this region the action camera market will increase from $1.876M in 
2019 to $7.930M in 2030. 
 
EMEA 
Furthermore, GoPro currently has foreign operations in France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Romania and United Kingdom. As per industry estimates, the action 
camera market in Europe is a continent strongly dependent of technologies as 
well. However, this region has already reached the entire targeted population, 
indicating that EMEA will decrease its share in the market. Indeed, EMEA region 
is estimated to grow at the lowest CAGR of 8%, achieving $2.999M revenues of 
the action camera market in 2030. 































Since GoPro’s cash flows are all in USD, we used the dollar inflation rate as a 
driver to predict GoPro’s future revenues. For each region, apart from determining 
the growth of the action camera market revenue, we obtained the past GoPro 
market share and estimated the future share for the company.  
In 2015, one year after getting public, GoPro accounted for over 45% of the 
action camera industry sales. Right now, it is an industry that is forecasting a 
flood of competition with new companies emerging and offering competitive 
products directly in GoPro’s category. Until now, GoPro’s share in the market has 
been decreasing, accounting for 16% in 2019. This tendency has been present in 
the past four years18 (see graph 25) and we expect it to continue as the industry 
grows. The lack of specific standard features, allied to high prices and the inability 
to diversify product lines among a drastic increase in competition, caused 
GoPro's stock price to reduce 86% in less than a year. Contrarily, it opened the 
opportunity for other companies to hit the market with new products and new 
features practicing lower prices. Sony, for example became increasingly 
successful in the action camera market, introducing technologically advanced 
devices. Sony expects operating income to increase in 3,7% and net income to 
increase 8%.  
In terms of new products for 2020, the company has recently launched two new 
cameras: the $399 limited edition HERO8 Black and GoPro Hero Max19 for 499$, 
both shipped on October 2019. During this Black Friday period GoPro.com 
achieved more than 120% YOY growth in total camera unit sales, where HERO8 
Black sold at high levels, comprising more than 90% of total sales. GoPro Hero 
Max has some new features acting as three cameras in one: a standard Hero 
action camera, a vlogging camera, thanks to the front-facing LCD display, and a 
360-degree camera. According to the CEO Nick Woodman, the company is going 
to increase its 2020 value due to the strength of new products launched late 
2019. Recently in the third quarter 2019, both HERO8 Black and MAX 
represented more than 75% of the camera revenues. This is one of the reasons 
that lead us to assume that in 2020 GoPro’s revenues will slightly increase again. 
GoPro also recently announced three new modular add-on accessories to help 
enhance some of the recently launched cameras’ features. The first is the $80 
Display Mod, that can be applied on the front or back of the camera to help users 
to better frame pictures, and the second one is the $50 waterproof light to attach 
to the top of the cameras. 
___________________________ 
18 Reuters. “According to TechStockInsider.com, Big Opportunity for Small Action Camera Makers as GoPro Suffers”. 
19 Digital Photography Review. 2019. “GoPro Max: a second-generation 360º action camera with Hyper Smooth, 360 Audio 
and more.” 
19 TechNews.com. 2019. “GoPro Hero 8 Black and GoPro Max Action Cameras Are All About Versatility” 




“GoPro Hero Max has 
the best stereo sound 
ever.” (since it has 6 
microphones) – GoPro 
Inc. Press Release, 2019  
Graph 25: 
 












The launch of these two accessories, which are essential to have a full GoPro 
experience - allowing the use of camera in extreme situations - will address the 
needs of vloggers and any other traveler enthusiast and expand the company’s 
market beyond GoPro’s core customers – extreme athletes. 
Operating Costs 
 
GoPro’s cost structure is highly dependent on sales, marketing and cost of revenue, 
being its biggest cost drivers. Although it was once a dominant player in the market, 
now GoPro faces profitability constraints and low operating margins due to high 
costs of marketing, inventory and research & development (see table 9). 
The cost of revenue is the most representative part of the COGS, which consist of 
shipping and handling costs, costs of manufacturing for production, logistics and 
warranty repair costs. This caption increased in 2017 due to one of GoPros’ 
developments in September 2017, namely the launch of the new mainstream 4K60 
video feature in action cameras. 
Being the greatest caption as a percentage of revenue, we expect the company to 
be more efficient and to converge towards its peers in terms of gross margin. 
Looking at Garmin’s outdoor segment as a benchmark, GoPro’s gross margin is 
lower. Therefore, we assume GoPro will decrease its COGS as a percentage of 
revenues, changing from 64% in 2019 to 55% in 2030. GoPro follows the strategy of 
shipping cameras via air, while accessories are ocean freighter from the facility in 








In what concerns operating expenses, GoPro is expected to resort more 
frequently to online sales.  Despite the Sales and marketing investment has 
been gradually losing its weight since 2016, there are still prospects of investment 
in this area from 2019 on. In order to increase brand awareness, we expect to 
see an increase in marketing expenditure, driven by GoPro’s desire to actively 
promote its brand, especially in the Asia Pacific market, by resorting to marketing 
“We are more focused 
on better understanding 
the customers that are 
encountering problems 
(…) with our marketing 
messages so that we 
can do a more effective 
job at educating them 
and converting them into 
paying customers.” – 
GoPro CEO 
in $ thousands 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Research and Development 151.852 241.694 358.902 229.265 167.296 173.151
% Revenues 11% 15% 30% 19% 15% 21%
Sales and Marketing 194.377 268.939 368.620 236.581 222.096 222.096
% Revenues 14% 17% 31% 20% 19% 26%
General and Administrative 93.971 107.833 107.367 82.144 66.004 70.190
% Revenues 7% 7% 9% 7% 6% 8%
Operating costs 440.200 618.466 834.889 547.990 455.396 465.437
Operating Income 187.035 54.748 -372.969 -163.460 -93.962 -131.833
Operating Margin 13% 3% -31% -14% -8% -16%















partnerships through physical distribution and by introducing more retail locations 
there. To sum up, marketing and distribution costs are expected to grow but at a 
low level until 2026 and then stabilize until the last forecasted year. This is 
certainly in line with Garmin, which is predicted to increase media advertising in 
the outdoor segment as well. 
General & Administrative expense is composed by salaries and personnel-
related costs. The fact that GoPro gave up on many employees, led to a 
decrease over the years in this caption. Right now, there are 912 employees. It 
plans to hire less, and so these costs are expected to decrease at least until 2022 
and to increase at a lower rate after that (graph 24). Once again, looking at 
Garmin, it has a higher number of employees. As of December 2018, the 
company had approximately 13.000 full and part-time employees worldwide20. 
For many years, GoPro had a lot of success with each product it invented. 
Blinded by that and expecting to grow like that forever, the CEO confessed that in 
early days the company didn’t make any consumer research. The investment in 
Research & Development has been decreasing from $358.9M in 2016 to 
$153.8M in 2019. The company invested in significant resources in the support 
for the launch of the Karma drone, and that is the reason why the highest number 
for this caption was hit in 2016. From now on, GoPro will focus on serving its 
customers by building the cameras while relying on surveys, feedback and testing 
among GoPro's customers. This will require an increase in Research and 
Development (R&D). We expect expenses in this area to increase for the future 
as the company desires to develop innovative technologies in the advanced 
capabilities of cameras. R&D will increase from 18% of revenues to 22% in the 
first two forecasted years. From 2023 on, it will slowly decrease as a percentage 
of revenues.  
Looking at peers, Sony states that it will continue to actively resort to technologies 
such as Fintech to improve operation efficiency mainly in the areas of product 
development and customer support, indicating it will increase investment in 
Marketing and R&D as well. Garmin is committed to grow the level of innovative 
design and development of new products toward improving technological 
aspects, turning into a cash-generating company. Its strong emphasis on R&D 
and the partnership between manufacturing and engineering teams drive 
innovation for its products.  
 
___________________________ 
20 5.000 employees in North America, 5.300 in Taiwan, 1.600 in Europe, and 1.100 other global locations. 
"By doing consumer research, 
we learned how important 
things like video stabilization 
are to them," 

















Smartphone companies like Apple, are extremely focused on introducing new 
features in their cameras, heavily investing in R&D for that. In order to differentiate in 
the market, GoPro will have to follow this trend. 
Capital Expenditure  
 
Operating lease right-of-use-assets is a caption that appeared only in 2019 with 
GoPro’s move of most of its US-bound camera production out of China. Instead, the 
company started to produce in Guadalajara, Mexico21, registering a value of $53M 
operating lease assets in 2019. We expect the value of the lease assets to remain 
flat until 2030. This new investment in fixed assets will impact ROIC, making it lower. 
Similarly, Garmin is planning to relocate its distribution center and to do a renovation 
of office22 for the next 5 years.  
In 2016, GoPro acquired two privately-held mobile editing application companies for 
$104M, part of this amount belonging to intangible assets. Since from 2017 until 
now this caption remained stable, we assume it will continue to represent the same 













GoPro has a high asset turnover ratio of 1.2, compared to Garmin, Sony and Nikon, 
which means that it is efficiently using its assets to generate sales. It registered 
negative capex in 2016, 2017 and 2019, which is not reasonable in comparison to its 
peers. Garmin’s net capex, for example, has risen significantly over the last 3 years, 




21Reuters. 2019. “GoPro - Under tariff threat, Mexico less attractive to companies avoiding China trade war”. 
21 Reuters. 2019. “GoPro to move U.S.-bound camera production out of China.” 
22Garmin’s vertically integrated manufacturing capabilities is one of its core competencies, having production facilities in 
Taiwan - Xizhi, Jhongli and LinKou – in China – Yangzhou - and in the U.S. - Olathe, Kansas, Salem and Oregon, which 
enables an easier application of resources necessary to serve its several products.  
23Garmin Ltd. Investor Relations Press Release, 2019. 
Table 10: 
 
in thousands 2015 2016 2017 2018
Net Capex 81.082$         263.274$      264.457$          
Gross FCF 516.981$       598.303$       781.825$      743.370$          
R&D 427.043$       467.960$       511.634$      567.805$          















Net Working Capital 
The captions that constitute the greatest weight of Net Working Capital in 2019 
are: Accounts Receivable ($72M), Inventory ($253M), Accounts Payable ($142M) 
and Accrued Liabilities ($161M). 
Contrary to its peers, GoPro’s payable period is longer than its average collection 









Regarding inventory, in the past GoPro overbuilt the costs to have its products 
displayed in stores because it expected to sell more than it actually sold. In 2018 
the average holding period dropped in relation to 2017, where there was 
accumulation of inventory. After the exit of the aerial products business, the 
inventory of the Karma drone was sold throughout 2018, which indicates a 
prospect of decrease for the future average holding period. Today, in order to 
nullify the impact of trade war and related tariffs, a shift in production facilities was 
done from China to Mexico. This led to production delays, more precisely of the 
Hero8 Black cameras shipment, and to an increase in inventory during 2019, 
where the company registered high levels of physical inventory, namely of $253M 
compared with $116.5M in 2018. 
In the fourth quarter of 2019 GoPro aimed to improve inventory management and 
to free up cash to run the business, and so it is expected to “lower the channel 
inventory” in order to be well-positioned for the first quarter in 2020.The average 
holding period will be reduced from 110 days in 2019 to 74 in 2020, achieving 49 
days in 2030. 
Concerning the accounts receivable, GoPro took 32 days in 2019 to receive 
from its customers. Nikon and Sony registered an average collection period of 43 













value until 2030. Driven by revenue growth, we foresee accounts receivable to 
increase from $72M in 2019 to $169M in 2030. 
 
We foresee the accounts payable to increase as well. This caption has been 
quite volatile over the past years, registering the highest payable period in 2016, 
namely of 103 days, mainly due to the difficulty to pay to its suppliers at the time 
of the Karma drone incident. The average payable period is going to slowly 
convert towards industry average, 40 days. 
The same occurred to the accrued liabilities, registering the highest values in 
2016 and 2017, and we expect this caption to increase in 2020 mostly due to 
obligations with the new products launched late 2019 and due to the increased 
accrued sales incentives. This caption is very high – $161M - in 2019 in 
comparison to its peers. 
To sum up, we expect the investment in Networking Capital to rise from -$20M in 
2019 to $54M in 2020.  
Equity and Debt 
 
Taking into consideration GoPro’s capital structure, the company is mainly 
dependent on debt financing. With debt reaching 111% of equity in 2019 (graph 
30), GoPro is considered a relatively high levered company, which is common for 
a small-cap company, since debt tends to be cheaper and sometimes more 
accessible. Compared to the competitors’ median market debt to equity ratio, 
which is 28,4%, we can state that GoPro is above the industry median (graph 29).  
On the contrary, Garmin’s cash flow is very strong thanks to shareholders’ 
dividends and buybacks, being able to grow the business almost debt free. 
The graph on the side shows that in 2019 GoPro had long-term debt of $148M, 
up from $138M in one year (graph 28). However, because it has a cash reserve 
of $27M in 2019, its net debt is about $121M. Moreover, GoPro generated $46M 
in operating cash flow during this same period, yielding an operating cash to total 
debt ratio of 31%, which implies that GoPro’s current level of operating cash is 
not high enough to support debt. This percentage indicates a sign of lack of 
operational efficiency for loss making companies like GoPro.  
For the future GoPro intends to keep its operations financed by a high level of 
debt. This combined with low earnings and extreme negative net loss can be risky 
resulting in unexpected downturns since liquidity may dry up in the long term, 























operations become a concern. GoPro has a negative interest coverage ratio, 
while its competitors have a positive one. This indicates that GoPro has 
difficulties in paying its interest payments on outstanding debt. However, thanks 
to its current level of short-term assets GoPro will be able to pay its upcoming 
liabilities. Regarding short-term liquidity, GoPro presents a quick ratio of 55%, 
which, despite being lower than its peers, indicates that GoPro’s debt is covered 
by assets. Short term assets of $431M exceed long-term - $238M - and short-
term liabilities - $325M - in 2019 (graph 31). 
In terms of equity, past payout ratios have been quite volatile due to the entry 
and exit of the aerial business, so it is hard to predict how they will be in the 
future. The ratio was assumed to be 0 for the future, due to GoPro’s low, negative 






DCF – Intrinsic Valuation 
To be able to value GoPro, Inc through a DCF, we had to compute the discount 
rates in order to reach WACC, which impact our results and conclusions. The 
unlevered cashflows were obtained and are presented in graph 33.  
The cost of equity (Re) was estimated under the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), according to three inputs: Risk-free rate, market risk premium and 
levered beta.  
First, regarding risk-free rate, we chose the last observed rate of the 10-year 
maturity US Government Bond – 1,9% - as a proxy for our risk-free rate, since 
most of GoPro’s business is done in the United Sates. In what concerns the 
market risk premium, the S&P500 as the return on the market, was used as 
market proxy, once again for being situated in the United States. We assumed a 
MRP of 6% according to the range acceptable by literature and analysts. The 
levered (rolling) Beta of GoPro is 1,002 and was computed with data from July 
2014 until December 2019, taking into account GoPros’ monthly returns and the 
above-mentioned US Government Bond. After calculating the previous inputs, we 
derived the cost of equity, being 7.9 % (table 11). 
To estimate the cost of debt we used the 5,9% return on the yield to maturity of 
GoPro’s most recent bond issued with maturity of 8 years, accounting for the cost 
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it would take to finance the company at the date of valuation. According to 
available data in Moody’s, we reached an annualized probability of default of 
0,392%.  As such, cost of debt was then adjusted considering this value and the 
loss given default of 46,1% (table 12). 
When calculating cost of capital, it is very important to account for the capital 
structure input. GoPro intends to maintain a high level of debt to finance its 
operations, reaching a market debt-to equity ratio of 66%. Taking this and the 
American current statutory tax rate of 21% into consideration we reached the 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital of 6,57% (table 13).  
After analyzing GoPro’s past performance, as well as its value drivers, relevant 
inputs and assumptions, a valuation of the company was done through the DCF 
method. The Gordon Growth Model was applied to the intrinsic valuation 
model, in which all the future operating unlevered free cash were discounted at 
the WACC in order to account for risk and capital structure decisions. The cash 
flows were estimated on a 10-year horizon, starting in 2020 until 2030, applying 
the long-term growth rate and a growing perpetuity subsequently. It is of extreme 
importance to have an accurate estimation of the terminal value, because it 
accounts for a large percentage of GoPro’s total value. The terminal value was 
computed by applying a perpetuity growth formula (GGM) to the last projected 
free cash flow of 2030. For each year, by adding non-cash expenses back to the 
NOPLAT and by subtracting all investment in fixed assets – capex and 
networking capital – we arrive at the core free cash flow, which is then discounted 




Observing GoPro’s Return on Invested Capital, one gets a perception of the 
performance of the company when using its capital to generate returns. 
Considering that the company’s ROIC has been quite volatile, experiencing 
returns on investment from approximately -49% in 2020 and reaching a positive 
ROIC of 17% in 2030, it is possible to conclude that GoPro will manage to create 
some value for its investors throughout the next years. The positive ROIC 
together with the high reinvestment rate generate a positive growth rate of 
around 3,2% and 2,6%, in 2029 and 2030, respectively (table 15). 
 
 
2020 (Today) 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
RR -194% -237% -361% -412% -517% -818% 2517% 834% 618% 614% 604%
ROIC -49% -45% -30% -26% -20% -12% 4% 13% 17% 17% 17%
g -5% 8% 6% 6% 2% 2% 10% 6% 4% 3% 3%





Debt (Mkt Value) 524.212.598$     
Equity (Mkt Cap) 799.958.183$     
WACC 6,57%
in thousands 2020 (Today) 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 Terminal Value
Unlevered FCF -104.180 -120.383 -87.591 -82.802 -59.622 -41.447 -16.942 22.304 43.171 47.236 51.615
Terminal Value 655.762





















To confirm if this growth rate is actually consistent with the long-term nominal 
growth rate (4,52%), we used the expected long-term (2030) local real growth per 
geography (weighted average according to GoPro’s revenues) of 2,47% and the 
2%-dollar inflation 2019/2020. Since GoPro is a global company, the growth rate 
obtained in the terminal value shall not be greater than the one of the global 
economies.  
Driven by growth rate in perpetuity, the Core Enterprise Value is $321M. By 
adding the non-core assets - $61M -, discounting non-core liabilities - $21M - and 
net debt of -$259M, we arrived at a Common Equity Value of $621M. Since the 
company has 144M shares outstanding, we were able to calculate a target price 
per share of $4.31 (see table 16). As of December, 30 2019, GoPro is trading at a 
market price of $4.47, which leads to a total shareholder return of -3,67%. 
Therefore, we assign GoPro a SELL investment recommendation. Despite 
GoPro’s expanding investment in such a demanded sector, worldwide, GoPro’s 
expected return is not high enough to a hold recommendation, due to the 
uncertainties associated with the business for the long-term. 
Multiples – Relative Valuation 
 
Finally, with the purpose of strengthening our investment decision, we conducted 
a multiples approach. We have selected GoPro’s 3 major comparable companies 
(Garmin, Nikon and Sony) that operate internationally and that seem to have the 
most similar kind of business. Given the available – despite limited - information 
for 2019, we benchmarked the Price to Sales ratio - the only one applicable to 
GoPro. GoPro registers a 0,67x price to sales ratio, which means investors are 
willing to pay 0,67 times GoPro’s sales for the stock. 
We decided to make an individual comparison between GoPro and its peers one 
by one. Contrarily to GoPro, Garmin registers a high price to sales ratio of 5,09x. 
This peer is the one that yields the higher share price namely of $32, far above 
the market. After comparing GoPro with the peers one by one (table 17), we 
reach the conclusion that the three peers, separately, result in higher share prices 


























When it comes to analyze the multiple as a whole, we obtain a range of 0.8x to 
5.1x, presenting a median Equity Value of $852M, which traduces into an 
average share price of 5.91$, indicating the GoPro’s stock is undervalued as well. 
We believe this multiple is not the best proxy for enterprise value since it doesn’t 
take into consideration the differences in cost structures and efficiencies across 
companies, nevertheless it was the only one that could be applied to GoPro, 
being the only one that yields a positive share price.  
We performed a football field summary, where we drew the conclusion, that the 
price reached in the Price/Sales multiple valuation is higher than the one reached 
in our DCF valuation, meaning that the DCF – where we incorporated our own 
expectations of the current strategic view plan for the company - trailed behind.  
Scenario Analysis 
 
GoPro operates in foreign countries, making operating expenses account to a 
significant share of revenue, being thus subject to challenges. Since international 
revenue outside the US accounts for 63%, 55% and 53% of revenue in 2018, 
2017 and 2016, respectively, the effect of interest rates and foreign currency 
exchange rates can affect GoPro’s business.  
 
With the competition arising in Japanese companies, GoPro wants to invest more 
in the APAC market, however, this requires significant resources and the 
company may have limited experience in marketing, selling, and in deploying their 
products. International expansion will require GoPro to invest important funds and 
it cannot be assured to be successful in this matter. Staffing and managing 
foreign operations will be another difficulty faced by GoPro, since the company 
may have to bring their existing employees to foreign countries or hire new ones 
and so, different employment practices may have to be adopted.  
Besides, GoPro is being affected by the competitors’ arising sales of the drone.  
To better understand the potential impact in Gopro’s business of both APAC’s 
tendency to increase consumer electronic demand and the increasingly Drone  
 
Sales 2020 907.202 Sales 2020 907.202 Sales 2020 907.202
Garmin Price/Sales 5,1x Nikon Price/Sales 0,9x Sony Price/Sales 0,98x
=Equity Value 4.617.656 =Equity Value 816.481 =Equity Value 889.058
Shares Outstanding 144.306 Shares Outstanding 144.306 Shares Outstanding 144.306
Share Price 32,00 Share Price 5,66 Share Price 6,16
Garmin Nikon Sony














market, a scenario analysis was conducted. Through our research, we came 
across, several times, with these two tendencies.  
The Drone market has been growing in a strong and rapid way. It is forecasted 
that the market of Drones will reach $65.300M by 2024. APAC is the region with 
the highest growth prospects for consumer electronics. In the scenario analysis 
we took into consideration 3 different scenarios: a base case scenario when 
everything remains as in the model, a best-case scenario, where the Drone’s 
market decreases its share, leading to an increase of 1% in GoPro’s market 
share and a 1% increase in demand for action cameras in the APAC region. 
Finally, we put in hypothesis a worst-case scenario, where the Drone market 
increases its market share, leading to a decrease of 1% of GoPro’s market share, 
and APAC stays stable. 
After running this analysis, we could detect that the share price increased from 
$4.31 to $4.37, not suffering a great change. It is also important to highlight that 
the hypothesis tested are not likely to happen. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Since the outcome of the DCF valuation method is highly sensitive to the 
assumptions made, at this point, we performed a sensitivity analysis to study the 
impact of the above-mentioned uncertainties and risks on the valuation. Since in 
our valuation the terminal value represents a positive, high amount, this may 
impact NOPLAT, and so it is crucial to conduct an analysis to quantify the impact 
of changes in the cost of capital (WACC) and terminal growth rate in the 
company’s share price. The results are shown in the following table, where 





By changing these two parameters, we obtain a range of prices between $2.49 
and $9.89.  Apart from that, since WACC is given by the Beta, we also tested the 
sensitivity specifically to various other betas: GoPro and competitors unlevered 
beta, confidence interval beta, relevered GoPro and industry Beta (table 19). 
A regression was done for the competitors (Garmin, Nikon, Sony) to obtain their 













Beta Regression 4,31 5,57% 6,07% 6,57% 7,07% 7,57%
1,56% 4,729278 3,962715 3,363240 2,884848 2,496867
2,06% 5,468763 4,511614 3,782360 3,212193 2,757309
2,56% 6,454064 5,216971 4,306044 3,612147 3,069753
3,06% 7,832182 6,156800 4,978998 4,111884 3,451501






























Apart from that, we also obtained the unlevered ones (table 21), which are lower 
because they do not consider the company’s debt risks. Considering the 
competitors median unlevered beta of 0.804 and GoPro’s rolling Beta of 1.002, a 
sensitivity analysis to the competitors unlevered betas was run through - which 
removes the financial effects of leverage. 
Conclusion 
 
In order to disclose our opinion, after an extensive research of GoPro, Inc., an 
analysis of market trends and future developments, we computed an intrinsic and 
relative valuation with regards to the financial statements, comprising the years 
2014 until 2019.  
Finally, we can acknowledge that, according to both the multiple- and the DCF 
Gordon Growth Model analysis, the target price obtained is just below GoPro’s 
current market trading share price, meaning the stock is underpriced. Therefore, 
our report aims to give the final investment recommendation to SELL GoPro’s 
stock. GoPro, with very few chances to become successful outside the core 
action camera business, once drones have flopped and 360 cameras suffer huge 
competition, is now facing profitability constraints, due to high costs and low 
revenues. To overcome the risk of becoming obsolete in the long term, a new 
product has to come out to excite consumers. According to our estimates and 
considering a target price of $4.31, compared with the current market price of 
$4.47 as of the 30 December 2019, we conclude that the company’s outlook for 
the next years seems to be threatening, whose investment is expected to yield a 










Beta Sensitivity Beta Share Price
1,00 4,31
Beta Lower 95% 0,29 3,5919
Relevered Industy Beta (with GoPro's D/E)0,44 3,7387
Relevered GoPro Beta (with industry D/E)0,54 3,8430
Unlevered Beta GoPro 0,66 3,9641
Unlevered Industry Beta 0,80 4,1072















All values in $ thousands 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019A 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028 2029 2030
Core Business
Operating Cash 27.884 32.399 23.710 23.595 22.967 16.790 18.144 19.523 20.983 22.536 24.059 25.635 26.922 28.147 29.043 29.797 30.416
Accounts receivable, net 183.992 145.692 164.553 112.935 129.216 72.999 82.043 91.809 102.624 111.138 123.391 132.000 147.519 154.845 160.413 165.237 169.344
Inventory 153.026 188.232 167.192 150.551 116.458 253.582 183.020 194.960 207.449 207.205 199.081 190.910 180.450 188.656 194.661 199.716 203.865
Prepaid expenses and other current assets 63.769 25.261 38.115 62.811 30.887 24.364 28.469 30.633 32.924 35.361 37.749 40.222 42.243 44.164 45.569 46.753 47.724
Property and equipment, net 41.556 70.050 76.509 68.587 46.567 40.291 36.789 39.584 42.546 45.694 57.734 61.516 64.606 67.544 69.695 71.504 72.990
Intangible assets, net 2.937 31.027 33.530 24.499 13.065 9.292 10.041 10.804 11.613 12.472 13.314 14.187 26.922 28.147 29.043 29.797 30.416
Goodwill 14.095 57.095 146.459 146.459 146.459 146.459 146.459 146.459 146.459 146.459 146.459 146.459 146.459 146.459 146.459 146.459 146.459
Operating Lease right-of-use-assets 0 0 0 0 0 53.258 53.258 53.258 53.258 53.258 53.258 53.258 53.258 53.258 53.258 53.258 53.258
Other long term assets - Pop Displays 18.743 27.989 27.592 16.451 9.130 9.131 9.133 9.134 9.135 9.136 9.137 9.138 9.138 9.138 9.138 9.138 9.138
Total Operating Assets 506.002 577.745 677.660 605.888 514.749 626.166 567.355 596.163 626.991 643.259 664.183 673.324 697.517 720.357 737.278 751.658 763.608
Accounts payable 126.240 89.989 205.028 138.257 148.478 142.263 131.654 130.773 135.809 132.195 132.352 131.770 127.735 128.883 129.083 129.769 129.388
Accrued sales incentives 9.635 29.298 40.070 89.549 40.918 46.818 39.770 47.821 54.585 53.243 59.635 61.954 55.191 56.293 56.633 55.124 56.269
Accrued payables 56.617 60.738 91.655 44.582 34.696 27.208 26.738 28.799 30.646 31.872 34.394 36.284 37.398 38.938 39.594 41.317 41.912
Employee related liabilities 28.959 27.535 42.577 24.945 19.775 17.044 18.773 20.918 19.510 20.854 23.018 24.594 25.167 25.784 26.423 27.679 28.083
Refund liability 0 0 0 0 13.100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Warranty liability 6.025 10.400 11.456 9.934 9.604 6.451 6.769 7.486 7.621 8.115 8.622 9.194 9.479 9.818 10.011 10.433 10.598
Inventory received 0 0 0 14.470 5.061 6.998 7.563 8.137 8.746 9.394 10.028 5.649 8.577 7.585 8.539 8.395 8.756
Customer deposits 4.903 8.877 4.381 8.700 3.105 3.823 4.320 4.508 5.039 4.832 5.539 5.539 5.539 5.539 5.539 5.539 5.539
Purchase order commitments 447 38.477 4.730 6.162 2.015 5.883 7.571 5.139 5.791 6.286 7.630 7.960 7.785 8.285 8.655 8.994 9.087
Income taxes payable 2.732 7.536 2.756 1.247 1.948 2.105 2.102 1.802 1.835 2.141 2.378 2.448 2.439 2.561 2.651 2.765 2.786
Other 9.189 9.585 13.698 13.441 5.670 45.409 13.441 13.441 13.441 13.441 13.441 13.441 13.441 13.441 13.441 13.441 13.441
Accrued Liabilities 118.507 192.446 211.323 213.030 135.892 161.740 127.047 138.050 147.214 150.178 164.685 167.063 165.016 168.244 171.487 173.687 176.472
Short-term operating Lease Liability 0 0 0 0 0 9.016 9.016 9.016 9.016 9.016 9.016 9.016 9.016 9.016 9.016 9.016 9.016
Long-term operating Lease Liability 0 0 0 0 0 63.442 63.442 63.442 63.442 63.442 63.442 63.442 63.442 63.442 63.442 63.442 63.442
Deferred revenue 14.022 12.742 14.388 19.244 15.129 12.136 10.804 11.625 12.495 13.420 14.326 15.264 16.031 16.760 17.294 17.743 18.111
Total Operating Liabilities 258.769 295.177 430.739 370.531 299.499 388.597 341.963 352.906 367.976 368.251 383.822 386.556 381.241 386.346 390.322 393.658 396.430
Invested Capital Net Operating Assets 247.233 282.568 246.921 235.357 215.250 237.569 225.391 243.257 259.015 275.008 280.362 286.767 316.276 334.011 346.955 358.000 367.178
Non Core Business
Marketable securities 102.327 194.386 25.839 44.886 45.417 36.471 36.471 36.471 36.471 36.471 36.471 36.471 36.471 36.471 36.471 36.471 36.471
Other long-term assets - Income Tax receivable 0 33.206 33.425 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other long-term assets - Long-term defered tax assets 8.611 41.936 106 825 945 885 18.150 13.577 14.244 13.713 15.529 15.529 15.529 15.529 15.529 15.529 15.529
Other long-term assets - Deposits and other 8.706 8.430 17.206 19.738 8.120 6.747 6.750 6.753 6.757 6.760 6.764 6.767 6.770 6.774 6.777 6.780 6.784
Total Non Operating Assets 119.644 277.958 76.576 65.449 54.482 44.102 61.370 56.801 57.471 56.944 58.763 58.766 58.770 58.773 58.776 58.780 58.783
Other long-term liabilities 4.452 13.996 18.570 29.774 28.203 10.756 8.604 6.884 6.884 6.884 6.884 6.884 6.884 6.884 6.884 6.884 6.884
Long-term taxes payable 13.266 21.770 26.386 21.188 19.553 16.000 11.951 10.560 7.423 6.928 5.650 3.664 -1.320 -4.228 -5.960 -6.230 -6.545
Total Non Operating Liabilities 17.718 35.766 44.956 50.962 47.756 26.756 20.556 17.444 14.307 13.812 12.533 10.547 5.563 2.655 923 653 338
Invested Capital Net Non Operating Assets 101.926 242.192 31.620 14.487 6.726 17.347 40.814 39.357 43.164 43.132 46.230 48.219 53.206 56.118 57.853 58.126 58.445
Financial
Excess Cash 292.045 247.273 168.404 178.909 129.128 26.837 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Financial Assets 292.045 247.273 168.404 178.909 129.128 26.837 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Long-term debt 0 0 0 130.048 138.992 148.326 259.257 401.081 530.221 664.534 792.323 914.241 1.027.402 1.111.011 1.181.719 1.254.610 1.331.109
Total Financial Liabilities 0 0 0 130.048 138.992 148.326 259.257 401.081 530.221 664.534 792.323 914.241 1.027.402 1.111.011 1.181.719 1.254.610 1.331.109
Net Financial Assets 292.045 247.273 168.404 48.861 -9.864 -121.489 -259.257 -401.081 -530.221 -664.534 -792.323 -914.241 -1.027.402 -1.111.011 -1.181.719 -1.254.610 -1.331.109
Common Shareholder's Equity 641.204 772.033 446.945 298.705 212.112 133.427 6.949 -118.467 -228.042 -346.393 -465.732 -579.255 -657.920 -720.882 -776.910 -838.483 -905.487
Dividends 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Equity 641.204 772.033 446.945 298.705 212.112 133.427 6.949 -118.467 -228.042 -346.393 -465.732 -579.255 -657.920 -720.882 -776.910 -838.483 -905.487



















All values in $ thousands 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019A 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
Core Business
NOPLAT 132.027 37.537 -417.570 -174.470 -98.201 -136.164 -116.358 -102.517 -71.834 -66.808 -54.269 -35.041 12.568 40.039 56.116 58.281 60.793
Depreciation and Amortization 17.945 28.981 41.640 41.478 35.063 23.841 18.227 13.528 14.490 15.508 16.592 20.735 22.036 23.099 24.110 24.850 25.473
Gross Free Cash Flow 149.972 66.518 -375.930 -132.992 -63.138 -112.323 -98.132 -88.990 -57.344 -51.300 -37.677 -14.306 34.604 63.139 80.226 83.131 86.266
Invested Capital - Fixed Assets 77.331 186.161 284.090 255.996 215.221 258.431 255.679 259.239 263.010 267.019 279.902 284.557 300.383 304.546 307.592 310.156 312.260
Gross Capex Investment -108.830 -97.929 28.094 40.775 -43.210 2.751 -3.560 -3.771 -4.009 -12.884 -4.655 -15.826 -4.162 -3.046 -2.564 -2.104
Net Capex -137.811 -139.569 -13.384 5.712 -67.051 -15.475 -17.088 -18.260 -19.517 -29.476 -25.390 -37.862 -27.262 -27.156 -27.414 -27.577
Invested Capital - NWC & Others 169.902 96.407 -37.169 -20.639 29 -20.861 -30.288 -15.982 -3.995 7.990 459 2.210 15.893 29.465 39.364 47.845 54.918
Net Working Capital & Others 73.495 133.577 -16.530 -20.668 20.890 9.427 -14.306 -11.987 -11.985 7.530 -1.751 -13.683 -13.572 -9.899 -8.481 -7.073
Investment FCF -64.316 -5.992 -29.914 -14.956 -46.161 -6.049 -31.393 -30.247 -31.502 -21.945 -27.141 -51.544 -40.834 -37.055 -35.895 -34.650
Core FCF 2.202 -381.922 -162.907 -78.094 -158.483 -104.180 -120.383 -87.591 -82.802 -59.622 -41.447 -16.940 22.304 43.171 47.236 51.615
Non-core Business
Operational Cash Flow -3.939 -382 512 476 3.926 1.643 6.244 5.705 6.509 6.955 8.246 8.933 9.633 10.349 10.431 10.522 10.621
Invested Capital 101.926 242.192 31.620 14.487 6.726 17.347 40.814 39.357 43.164 43.132 46.230 48.219 53.206 56.118 57.853 58.126 58.445
Investment FCF -140.266 210.572 17.133 7.761 -10.621 -23.468 1.457 -3.807 32 -3.097 -1.989 -4.987 -2.911 -1.736 -273 -318
Non-core FCF -140.648 211.084 17.609 11.687 -8.978 -17.223 7.162 2.702 6.987 5.149 6.944 4.646 7.437 8.696 10.248 10.303
Operational FCF -138.447 -170.838 -145.297 -66.406 -167.461 -121.404 -113.221 -84.889 -75.815 -54.473 -34.503 -12.294 29.742 51.867 57.485 61.918
Financing
Financial Result 0 -1.024 -1.945 -8.879 -14.760 -15.335 -16.364 -28.603 -44.250 -58.498 -73.316 -87.415 -100.866 -113.351 -122.575 -130.376 -138.418
Net Financial Assets 292.045 247.273 168.404 48.861 -9.864 -121.489 -259.257 -401.081 -530.221 -664.534 -792.323 -914.241 -1.027.402 -1.111.011 -1.181.719 -1.254.610 -1.331.109
Investment in Net Financial Assets 44.772 78.868 119.543 58.725 111.625 137.768 141.824 129.140 134.313 127.790 121.918 113.160 83.609 70.708 72.891 76.500
Net Transaction with shareholders 94.698 93.915 34.633 22.441 71.171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Financing FCF 138.447 170.838 145.297 66.406 167.461 121.404 113.221 84.889 75.815 54.473 34.503 12.294 -29.742 -51.867 -57.485 -61.918
Checkline TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE













Cash Flow Statement 
 
 
All values in $ thousands 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019A 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
Core
Americas 890.352 868.772 619.784 591.879 498.633 383.893 367.318 404.049 380.564 397.231 403.342 443.677 447.374 447.374 442.900 433.058 416.818
EMEA 371.197 535.260 366.352 334.872 366.037 256.800 212.597 198.991 214.910 228.532 246.814 249.900 247.401 250.190 262.335 254.989 214.191
APAC 132.656 215.939 199.345 252.990 283.667 198.796 327.287 373.107 453.698 501.053 552.775 588.152 651.337 709.765 746.892 801.788 889.772
Consolidated Revenues 1.394.205 1.619.971 1.185.481 1.179.741 1.148.337 839.490 907.202 976.147 1.049.172 1.126.816 1.202.932 1.281.729 1.346.111 1.407.329 1.452.126 1.489.835 1.520.781
Cost of goods sold 766.970 946.757 723.561 795.211 786.903 543.323 533.930 575.085 611.979 652.044 690.119 728.729 751.987 784.037 798.566 830.979 843.332
Cost of revenue 765.247 944.304 719.689 786.657 772.136 537.273 526.177 566.165 603.274 642.285 679.656 717.768 740.361 772.450 787.053 819.409 831.867
Stock-based compensation 835 1.492 1.616 1.935 1.954 1.428 1.544 1.661 1.785 1.917 2.047 2.181 2.291 2.252 2.178 2.235 2.129
Acquisition related costs 888 961 1.759 5.985 11.434 4.621 6.210 7.258 6.919 7.841 8.416 8.780 9.335 9.335 9.335 9.335 9.335
Restructuring costs 0 0 497 634 1.379 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gross Margin 627.235 673.214 461.920 384.530 361.434 296.167 373.271 401.063 437.194 474.773 512.812 553.000 594.124 623.292 653.561 658.856 677.450
Research and Development 151.852 241.694 358.902 229.265 167.296 153.847 199.584 214.752 220.326 233.251 252.616 269.163 269.222 274.429 290.425 293.498 266.137
Sales and Marketing 194.377 268.939 368.620 236.581 222.096 205.111 217.728 224.514 230.818 247.900 252.616 256.346 256.346 256.346 256.346 256.346 288.948
General and Administrative 93.971 107.833 107.367 82.144 66.004 69.041 54.432 48.807 47.213 50.707 54.132 57.678 57.678 57.678 57.678 57.678 68.435
Total operating expenses and costs 1.207.170 1.565.223 1.558.450 1.343.201 1.242.299 971.322 1.005.675 1.063.158 1.110.336 1.183.901 1.249.483 1.311.915 1.335.233 1.372.490 1.403.015 1.438.501 1.466.852
Operating Loss before tax (EBIT) 187.035 54.748 -372.969 -163.460 -93.962 -131.833 -98.474 -87.011 -61.163 -57.085 -46.551 -30.187 10.879 34.839 49.112 51.335 53.929
Taxes on operating loss -55.008 -17.211 -44.601 -11.010 -4.239 -4.331 -17.885 -15.506 -10.670 -9.723 -7.718 -4.854 1.690 5.200 7.004 6.946 6.864
Operating Loss after tax (NOPLAT) 132.027 37.537 -417.570 -174.470 -98.201 -136.164 -116.358 -102.517 -71.834 -66.808 -54.269 -35.041 12.568 40.039 56.116 58.281 60.793
Non Core
Other income, net -6.060 -588 787 733 4.970 2.079 7.630 6.942 7.884 8.383 9.885 10.645 11.405 12.165 12.166 12.168 12.170
Taxes 2.121 206 -275 -257 -1.044 -437 -1.386 -1.237 -1.375 -1.428 -1.639 -1.712 -1.771 -1.816 -1.735 -1.647 -1.549
Non-operating loss -3.939 -382 512 476 3.926 1.643 6.244 5.705 6.509 6.955 8.246 8.933 9.633 10.349 10.431 10.522 10.621
Financial
Interest expense 0 -1.575 -2.992 -13.660 -18.683 -19.411 -20.714 -36.207 -56.013 -74.048 -92.806 -110.652 -127.678 -143.482 -155.158 -165.033 -175.213
Tax Shield 0 551 1.047 4.781 3.923 4.076 4.350 7.603 11.763 15.550 19.489 23.237 26.812 30.131 32.583 34.657 36.795
Net Financial Profit after Tax 0 -1.024 -1.945 -8.879 -14.760 -15.335 -16.364 -28.603 -44.250 -58.498 -73.316 -87.415 -100.866 -113.351 -122.575 -130.376 -138.418
Comprehensive Income 128.088 36.131 -419.003 -182.873 -109.034 -149.856 -126.478 -125.416 -109.575 -118.351 -119.339 -113.523 -78.665 -62.963 -56.028 -61.573 -67.004
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The action camera market is being disrupted by the growing consumer trend for 
choosing smartphones with new and better camera features, replacing the 
traditional cameras. In this report I analyzed the effect of the smartphone era in 
GoPro’s core business. Taken Apple as an example, and following the future 
innovation of the iPhone camera, a sensitivity analysis was performed, to 
measure the impact of a higher than usual investment of GoPro in Research and 
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Appendix II: Disruption of the Action Camera market by the Smartphone Era 
Rita Coimbra 34453 
In today’s generation the action camera market is being disrupted. With the constant 
development of smartphones, GoPro is being forced to work on different features to become more user-
friendly. Examples of that are the Quick mobile editing applications and the GoPro Plus cloud service, 
that offer the possibility to share photos directly from GoPro’s mobile apps focusing on “making the 
smartphone a key component in the GoPro user”1. This proves that GoPro has already assumed that the 
smartphone will always act as an intermediary.  
In the past, GoPro was lucky because, as the first player in the market, never had a direct 
competitor, other than some late interventions from Sony, Garmin or DJI. What GoPro cannot combat, 
is a product with almost the same capacities that does not need an intermediary – the smartphone. Today, 
smartphones with high photo and video functionality seem to be displacing the market for traditional 
camera sales.  
According to Statista, the number of smartphone units 
shipped2 is forecasted to be 1.615M in 2022 worldwide, whereas it 
is predicted that the action cameras amount to 23M units in the same 
year (see Exhibit 1). 
The reason behind this, is the high improvement that 
companies like Samsung, Huawei and Apple, who dominate the 
smartphone market, are doing on smartphone cameras through deep 
learning. The manufacturers of these companies are heavily investing in the versatility and advanced  
 ______________________ 
1“Financials & Filings - Annual Reports and Proxies | GoPro Inc.Investor.gopro.com. Available at: https://investor.gopro.com/financials-
and-filings/annual-reports-and-proxies/default.aspx 
















system of functions of the smartphone cameras, introducing new products with proper designs to handle 
the same conditions as GoPro, such as waterproof or challenging physical environments3.  
A lot of exciting features that improve user experience will be implemented, including image 
sensors by integrating a low-cost, complex processor into the cameras.  
According to research, machine learning is consequently becoming a disruptive trend in the 
market. Considering the demanding Artificial Intelligence of today’s generation, and all the 
applications that require deep learning technologies4, companies have to be aware of the specific 
techniques necessary to develop a differentiated product. According to the Camera and Imaging Products 
Association (CIPA) a disturbing downward trend is visible5. In comparison to June 2018, the number of 
digital cameras shipped declined by 74.8% in June 2019, and there are no signs for this situation to get 
better. The use of compact cameras has dropped by 88% because of the smartphone. “In Imaging System, 
we expect sales and profit of interchangeable-lens cameras to decline, due to the continued impact of 
mainly entry-class DSLR market contraction”6 according to Canon’s Executive Vice President and the 
CFO. 
Consumers are now passing through a time-age of surging innovation characterized by the new 
technologies like cloud computing and the “Internet of Things”, which are gaining great scale.  Analysts 
highlighted that not only Apple, but also its competitors - Samsung or Huawei - are resorting to machine 
learning techniques to develop their devices with the purpose of combining photos to achieve results 
with better quality. One of their aim is to manage to brighten photographs taken in low light performance 
or night mode. 
 
 ______________________ 
3Nasim Mansurov. 2019. “The Smartphone vs The Camera Industry.”. Photographylife.com. Available at: 
https://photographylife.com/smartphone-vs-camera-industry 
42019. “Smart Camera Trend in the Future – Innomiles”. Innomiles. Available at: https://www.innomiles.com/smart-camera-trend-in-the-
future/ 
52019. “CIPA - Camera & Imaging Products Association: HOME”. Cipa.jp. Available at:http://www.cipa.jp/index_e.html 












The new, recently launched iPhone 11, is an example of a potential future replacement of action 
cameras. Consequently, it is getting difficult for the consumer to create more value as before within the 
action camera market. Deutsche Bank analyst’s reaction to the new launch was like: “Camera, Camera, 
Camera is the new iPhone 11”. 
Apple, by launching the new iPhone with a dual camera system2, is offering enhanced features 
like high image and video. Apple CEO Tim Cook has said there are indeed 800 people dedicated to 
improving the iPhones cameras.  
This year Apple is heavily focused on camera improvements. The reason for this is the fact that 
today consumers care a lot about camera quality. Apple is using artificial intelligence and machine 
learning to capture multiple pictures at the same time, which requires high-end hardware. The company 
has developed a new software feature named “Deep Fusion”, which guarantees more details to the 
scenarios captured by cameras, by taking 9 pictures at the same time. “Consumers upgrade for better 
cameras – among other reasons,” Forrester analyst stated. It seems that today the number of cameras on 
the back of one’s iPhone is becoming a social signal, according to Cybart7.  
Moreover, Apple is looking to develop its video capabilities through the introduction of the 
new triple camera system, probably meaning a better 4K or 8k or even 3D for the future. The video 
recording software was improved in the new iPhone as well, by developing a new app for the 11 Pro 
Max camera to record with the 3 cameras at the same time. What is happening is that the camera is being 
recognized as the iPhone’s distinguishing feature. “Camera is what consumers still care about most and 
where most expect innovation to happen”7. Apart from that, since the cameras are easy to observe and 
test before buying, it is used as a benchmark for users. Apple’s analyst predicts for 2020 iPhones to have 
a 3D time-of-flight (ToF)8 sensor.  
 ______________________ 
7Kif Leswing. 2019. “Apple is becoming a camera company.” CNBC. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/15/apple-iphone-11-
shows-transformation-to-camera-company.html 














This feature is typically used in cameras connected to drones or self-driving cars (to prevent 
them from crash) because it efficiently measures how long it takes for a laser, liquid or light for example 
to travel a certain distance. According to Bloomberg, given the prevalence of Apple’s hardware and the 
impact it tends to have on the industry and since several phones on the market already contain ToF 
cameras, it is worth for Apple to develop this type of technology. By doing this, the company aims to 
focus on allowing the future iPhone to scan the room in three dimensions.  
It is expected that Apple keeps improving its dual-camera system, a feature that will likely 
become standard not only in the “Plus model”, but in all future iPhones.  
Photo quality take three aspects into account: the image sensor measuring the light amount 
entering through it, the quality of the lens and the image signal processor, which helps to compose the 
final picture. According to an analysis made by the venture capitalist from CIPA, the forecasted rise of 
“pro” cameras on smartphones can negatively impact action camera sales in the future.  Once again, a 
heavy investment in Research & Development was required to produce such a developed product. Apple 
had to increase its R&D Expense9 in 15%, 23% and 14% in 2017, 2018 and 2019, respectively (see 




Given the success achieved through his investment, I performed a sensitivity analysis to 
measure the impact of an increase of the same caption in GoPro’s share price. I assumed that R&D will 
maintain the same percentage of revenues (Exhibit 3) over the years and will increase in value in line 
with Apple’s average growth rate of the last 3 year (2017, 2018 and 2019), traducing into a 17% growth 
YOY.  
______________________ 
9“Apple - Investor Relations”. Investor.apple.com. Available at: https://investor.apple.com/investorrelations/default.aspx 
 
All values in $ millions 2017 2018 2019
Research and Development 11 581 14 236 16 217
Growth % 15% 23% 14%
% of revenue 5% 5% 6%

















Looking at the scenario in which GoPro becomes successful in integrating these new, 
innovative features into its products, meanings it manages to substantial increase the level of revenues 






To conclude, the revenue’s CAGR (2020-2030) is now 17,44% instead of 5,3%. Considering 
this scenario, where GoPro heavily invests in R&D from 2020 onwards, GoPro’s share in the action 
camera market will increase from 14,2% in 2020 to 24,4% in 2030 due to the higher revenues. Driven 
by higher growth rates in the forecasted years (see Exhibit 4), the share price becomes $4,71 yielding 
a 5,4% expected return (see Exhibit 5). A HOLD investment recommendation was achieved for GoPro. 
Still, GoPro didn’t manage to get a BUY recommendation, given the challenging environment it is 






All values in $ thousands 2019A 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2029F 2030F
Revenues 839 490 818 189 959 574 1 178 981 1 402 752 1 621 650 1 901 876 2 230 526 2 615 967 3 034 522 3 520 046 4 083 253
Growth % 8,1% 17,3% 22,9% 19,0% 15,6% 17,3% 17,3% 17,3% 16,0% 16,0% 16,0%
Action Camera Market Revenues 5 209 135 5 779 374 6 415 086 7 124 126 7 915 324 8 798 617 9 785 187 10 887 621 12 120 096 13 498 585 15 041 088 16 767 897
Share of GoPro in Action Camera Market 16,1% 14,2% 15,0% 16,5% 17,7% 18,4% 19,4% 20,5% 21,6% 22,5% 23,4% 24,4%
Research and Development 153 847 180 001 211 106 247 586 290 370 340 546 399 394 468 410 549 353 637 250 739 210 857 483
% revenues 18% 22% 22% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21%
Growth % 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 16% 16% 16%
Exhibit 3: 
 
Growth rate 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Base Scenario -5,13% 7,93% 6,48% 6,17% 1,95% 2,28% 10,29% 5,61% 3,88% 3,18% 2,56%












Base scenario 5,30% 4,31 -3,67% Sell
Sensitivity to R&D Increase 17,44% 4,71 5,40% Hold
